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Abstract
How does future income uncertainty a↵ect child labour and human capital
accumulation? Using a unique panel dataset, we examine the e↵ect of changes
in climate variability on the allocation of time among child labour activities
(the intensive margin) as well as participation in education and labour activities (the extensive margin). We find robust evidence that increased climate
variability increases the number of hours spent on farming activities while reducing the number of hours spent on domestic chores, indicating a substitution
of time across child labour activities. In addition, we find no evidence of climate variability on enrolment decisions or educational outcomes, suggesting
that households may spread the burden of labour across children to minimise
its impact on formal education.
(JEL: D13, O12, J13, J22, Q54.)
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Introduction

While it is clear that income shocks cause significant welfare e↵ects ex post,
there is a paucity of evidence demonstrating how future income uncertainty
can a↵ect economic outcomes ex ante. This paper examines how future income
uncertainty, proxied by climate variability, a↵ects household investment decisions through the channels of child labour and human-capital accumulation in
rural Ethiopia – one of the least developed countries in Africa, characterised
by a high vulnerability to climate change and variability.
If households are limited in their ability to mitigate the e↵ects of shocks,
then expectations about the incidence of future shocks, as well as the incidence
of shocks, may lead them to sacrifice valuable investments with long-run implications to meet short-run needs (Udry, 1994; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Duflo,
2000; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). Even in
developed countries, it has been shown that around half of the inequality in
the present value of lifetime earnings is due to factors determined by the age
of 18 (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; 2008).
The motivation of this paper is two-fold. First, we want to understand how
uncertainty a↵ects investment decisions – a question that presents a number
of measurement and identification issues. Secondly, we want to better understand how environmental quality a↵ects investment decisions, specifically, how
climate can influence decision-making and economic outcomes.
We examine the impact of future income uncertainty on the labour supply
of children – a risk-management strategy – and the trade-o↵ between time
spent working and educational attainment. This is the first paper to consider
how future income uncertainty a↵ects the risk-management strategies of rural
households on both the intensive margin (the allocation of time to di↵erent
child labour activities) and extensive margin (enrolment and labour participation decisions.)2
2

Fitzsimons (2007) and Kazianga (2012) consider how households respond along the
extensive margin to perceived future risk using cross-sectional data and di↵erent identification strategies; however, no detailed empirical analysis of either the intensive and extensive
margin has been conducted using panel data, allowing us to control for time-invariant het-
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Our results add to the growing literature exploring climatic influence on
economic outcomes (Barreca et al. 2013; Burgess et al. 2011; Deschenes and
Greenstone, 2007; 2011; 2012; Dell, Jones and Olken, 2009; 2012; Fischer et
al., 2012; Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell, 2010; Gra↵ Zivin et al., 2013; Guiteras, 2009;
Hsiang, 2010; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009) as well as the literature looking
at the impacts of risk on educational outcomes (Fitzsimons, 2007; Kazianga,
2012).
Using two rounds of individual-level panel data, combined with a new data
set of village-level meteorological data, we exploit exogenous variation in future
income uncertainty to examine the relationship between climate variability and
child labour.
We observe that an increase in future income uncertainty results in a substitution of child labour across activities, from labour in the home to labour on
the farm, i.e., adjustment on the intensive margin. However, in contrast to the
previous literature examining the e↵ects of ex ante risk on human capital investments (Fitzsimons, 2007; Kazianga, 2012), we find no evidence to suggest
that climate variability decreases the likelihood that children attend school or
a↵ects educational attainment, indicating the potential for omitted-variable
bias due to unobserved individual heterogeneity. We demonstrate the importance of controlling for time-invariant omitted variables through replicating
the results of these previous studies using individual cross-sections.
Our results can be interpreted as causal e↵ects, conditional on the assumption that our measure of climate variability a↵ects child labour and schooling
only through uncertainty about future states of the world. In order to support
this assumption, we show that our results are robust to controlling for past and
contemporaneous rainfall shocks and other time-varying factors which may be
correlated with our measure of income uncertainty, as well as time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity at the village level. Alem and Colmer (2013) also
demonstrate rigorous evidence supporting the plausibility of this measure in
an examination of the impact of income uncertainty on experienced utility in
rural Ethiopia.
erogeneity.
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We also present the results from a series of placebo and robustness tests
used to disentangle the e↵ect from other confounding factors and provide supporting evidence for the main identification assumption.3
This narrative is distinct from the literature, which has focussed on child
labour and reductions in human capital investments as an ex post response to
adverse shocks (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000; Pörtner, 2001; Ranjan,
2001; Sawada & Lokshin, 2001; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Thomas et al., 2004;
Beegle et al., 2006). The decision to withdraw children from school, most
frequently observed in response to adverse shocks, may arise from a need to
reduce expenditures; it is less likely that there would be an increase in child
labour due to reductions in the marginal product of labour. If there is an
increase in child labour it is likely to be o↵-farm and so may result in an
increase in child labour supply along the extensive margin ,i.e., the decision
to engage in work outside of the home.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a
brief background and literature review; section 3 presents a simple theoretical
model which supports and motivates our findings; section 4 provides a brief
summary of the data along with caveats; section 5 describes our empirical
specification and outlines our identification strategy; section 6 presents the
main results and a discussion of the implications; section 7 reports supporting
evidence and robustness checks; section 8 concludes.

2

Background

In a recent publication, the World Bank (2010) argues that climate change
will disproportionately a↵ect poor households, especially women and children.
Children may be withdrawn from school in response to climatic shocks, with
long-run and irreversible impacts on human capital and, consequently, lifetime
earnings. In addition, while the majority of child labour is at home, o↵-farm
3

Appendix C provides a number of more mechanical robustness tests, which help support
the statistical and economics significance of the results but matter less for supporting the
identification assumptions made.
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child labour is very responsive to negative income shocks.4 There is little
evidence, however, on the role that income uncertainty plays in education and
child labour decisions. Uncertainty in climate patterns can pose a serious
threat to agricultural productivity (Cline, 2007; Easterling et al., 2007) and
place increased pressure on household responsibilities and activities. There is
considerable evidence from Asia to show that delays and variation in the timing
of the wet season can have significant productivity impacts; the evidence in
Africa, mainly due to data limitations, is more scarce.
Developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change: they are
more physically exposed as a result of their location in the Tropics and other
areas that are regularly subjected to extreme weather events, such as storms,
droughts, flooding, and extreme temperatures; they are more economically
sensitive, due to weak infrastructure and heavy reliance on agriculture; they
also have a lower adaptive capacity, resulting from institutional and governance
factors.
In the face of uninsured risk, households that are subject to greater variability have a greater incentive to accumulate precautionary savings to smooth
consumption against future risk (Kimbell,1991; Paxson, 1992; Carroll, 1997;
Carroll & Kimbell, 2001). The pivotal result in this literature states that, in
the presence of uninsured risk, prudent households are likely to save more than
in the absence of uncertainty. The existing literature focuses on the e↵ects of
income uncertainty on consumption and asset portfolios. One channel through
which this e↵ect may be observed, first discussed by Cain (1982), and more
recently discussed in Fitzsimons (2007), is not to enrol children in school.5 Education is an irreversible investment with delayed, and potentially increasing,
marginal returns. Fafchamps and Pender (1997) further argue that the precautionary motive for holding liquid assets impedes productive investment, such
as investments in education, even if households are able to self-finance them.
As a result, it is argued that the e↵ect of the precautionary motive on irre4

Unfortunately, there is not sufficient data to examine the e↵ect of shocks on wage
labour carried out by children.
5
It is assumed that children would engage in child labour in place of this activity, though
it is possible that children may remain idle.
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versible and illiquid investments, such as education, is augmented. There are
two mechanisms which can be explored here. The first mechanism arises from
the decision not to enrol children in school to increase saving through reduced
educational expenditures, as discussed above, with an assumed increase in the
labour supply of children along the extensive margin, or increased idleness.
The second mechanism results from a risk-management and productivity motive by which households may invest more in the land, taking more care over
the land-preparation and cultivation stages in e↵orts to reduce the likelihood
of crop failure in the event of an adverse shock. This mechanism works along
the intensive margin of labour supply. The question that remains is whether
an increase in labour supply along the intensive margin is sufficient to also
a↵ect decisions on the extensive margin. It is assumed that parents optimally
invest in the number and quality of children, determined by investments in
human capital, to maximise household welfare. Under this assumption, Fitzsimons (2007) argues that children have an instantaneous earnings potential in
addition to the benefit of reduced educational expenditures. Consequently, we
might expect that higher levels of risk should result in a greater incentive to
increase the number of hours worked by children and reduce investments in
education.
If this risk results in reduced investment in human capital then the potential welfare cost may have long-run welfare costs via worsened later-life
outcomes and opportunity (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Maccini and Yang,
2009; Banerjee et al., 2010; Antilla-Hughes & Hsiang, 2013). Indeed, even delays in educational attainment may have large e↵ects if children are not able
to reach a level of education that has real returns. These costs may be further exacerbated if households reduce investments in children based on gender
(Sen, 1990; Duflo, 2005; Antilla-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013).
However, in many studies, this study included, we observe children are
capable of both working and attending school.6 Ravallion and Wodon (2000)
argue that poor families can protect the schooling of working children because
6

75% of our sample both attend school and work, either on the farm or in the home.
49% attend school and work on the farm. 59% attend school and work in the home.
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there are other things that children do besides school and work.
“One cannot assume that the time these children spend working must come
at the expense of formal time at school, although there may be displacement of
informal (after-school) tutorials or homework.”
Jayachandran (2013) demonstrates, however, that the displacement of informal schooling may have significant welfare e↵ects of its own. If schools o↵er
for-profit tutoring to their own students, this gives teachers a perverse incentive to teach less during school to increase demand for tutoring. Consequently,
those who do not participate in tutoring could be adversely a↵ected.
This paper explores whether uncertainty about future income is enough
to displace investment in education. We argue that, while the realisation of
income shocks may result in the withdrawal of children from school, it is likely
that households are able to reallocate time across activities and children to
minimise the e↵ect on education. If this is the case, we would expect to observe
an increase in child labour on the intensive margin (the loss-minimisation
motive) but no enrolment e↵ects on the extensive margin (the precautionary
savings motive). Whether there is an e↵ect on educational attainment depends
on whether there is a large enough impact on the intensive margin of education
(unobserved in the data) or whether informal education in the form of tutoring
is an important determinant, as in Jayachandran (2013).7

3

Theoretical Framework

To motivate our empirical work and demonstrate the plausibility of our findings, we introduce a two-period model of the child labour supply decision in
agricultural households in the spirit of Rose (2001). The two-period frame-
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Ideally, test scores would provide a more accurate measure of educational attainment.
To observe an impact on the grades attained there would have to be sufficient impact in
order to stop schooling, or to not progress to the next year.
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work allows for explicit consideration of ex ante and ex post decisions.8 In
both periods, the household makes decisions regarding the time-allocation of
children between labour supply on the farm, in the home, and schooling. Timeallocation is normalised to 1. The first period is characterised as prior to the
realisation of rainfall. This could be seen as the cultivation and land preparation stages of agriculture. In the second period, rainfall is realised, and again
households respond to this through the time-allocation decision, conditional
on the decision in period 1. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of
the model.

In period 1, the household does not know how much rainfall, ⇠, there will
be, but does know its distribution. The household knows the average level of
rainfall over time for the area (µ), and knows the variability of the distribution
measured as the coefficient of variation ('), the standard deviation divided by
the mean. In this respect, the coefficient of variation could be seen as the
probability of a shock occurring in period 2. The household’s time-allocation
decision for the first period depends on µ and ', in addition to household
wealth, Y, the shadow price of the activity, ! i , and the parameters of the
production technology, ✓.
In each period, time can be allocated to labour on the farm, domestic
chores, or schooling.9
The ex ante labour supply on the farm is:
LF1 = LF1 (µ, ', ! F , Y, ✓)
8

This paper focusses on ex ante decisions. As already mentioned, there is a considerable
literature that has focussed on ex post responses to adverse shocks (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997;
Jensen, 2000; Pörtner, 2001; Ranjan, 2001; Sawada & Lokshin, 2001; Bhalotra & Heady,
2003; Thomas et al., 2004; Beegle et al., 2006). The results presented in the second period
of this model are consistent with the results in this literature.
9
Allowing for an additional dimension, idleness, changes none of the results in the model.
For clarity, we restrict our analysis to the three dimensions discussed.
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The ex ante labour supply in the home is:
H
H
LH
1 = L1 (µ, ', ! , Y, ✓)

The ex ante investment in education is:
E1 = E1 (µ, ', ! E , Y, ✓) = 1

LF1

LH
1

There are two channels by which we might expect ' to a↵ect these decisions. First, there is a “portfolio e↵ect” whereby, given the shadow price of an
activity, the household will adjust the time-allocation of children away from
risky activities on the farm towards less risky investments in schooling and in
the home. The second e↵ect results from a precautionary motive. Prior to
the realisation of a shock, households may allocate more time to labour on
the farm to mitigate the e↵ects of a shock in the event that it is realised. If
the precautionary e↵ect dominates the portfolio e↵ect, we would expect the
following:
@LF1
@LH
@E1
1
> 0,
< 0,
<0
@'
@'
@'
In this case, an increase in risk, ', will increase child labour supply on
the farm, reduce child labour supply in the home, and reduce investment in
education.
By contrast, if the portfolio e↵ect dominates, then we would expect:
@LF1
@LH
@E1
1
< 0,
> 0,
>0
@'
@'
@'
In this case, an increase in risk, ', will reduce child labour supply on the
farm, increase child labour supply in the home, and increase investment in
education.
In period 2, the value of rainfall, ⇠, is realised, and households can respond
to it. Conditional on labour supply in period 1, there is no reason for ' to
a↵ect household decision-making once ⇠ is realised. Consequently, the ex post
labour supply decision for farming is:
8

LF2 = LF2 (LF1 (·), µ, ", ! F , Y, ✓)
The ex post labour supply in the home is:
H
H
F
LH
2 = L2 (L1 (·), µ, ", ! , Y, ✓)

The ex post investment in education is:
E2 = E2 (E1 (·), µ, ", ! E , Y, ✓) = 1

LF2

LH
2

where " = ⇠ µ, i.e., " is the deviation in rainfall from the mean.
The e↵ect of " on time allocation can be separated into an income e↵ect
and a substitution e↵ect. If the realisation of rainfall is below average (" is
low), then income is lower and the household may need to withdraw children
from school to smooth income (the income e↵ect); however, if the returns to
education (child labour on the farm) are decreasing (increasing) as " increases,
then we would expect an increase (decrease) in schooling (child labour on the
farm) following a negative shock (the substitution e↵ect). In the literature
which has examined ex post responses to adverse shocks through education
and child labour, the income e↵ect has consistently been shown to dominate
the substitution e↵ect at low income levels. The remainder of this paper
attempts to tackle the question of ex ante decision making in the context of
child labour and education, motivated by the hypotheses presented in this
model.

4

Data

The analysis conducted in this paper uses two rounds of the Ethiopian Rural
Household Survey collected by the University of Addis Ababa, the Centre for
the Study of African Economics (CSAE) at the University of Oxford, and the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), covering 15 communi-
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ties in rural Ethiopia.10 This paper makes use of the latest two rounds of this
panel from 2004 and 2009. These years are included as they contain consistent identifiers of child labour across time and are the only years to contain
individual-level identifiers, allowing us to track children across the rounds.11
The villages in the survey represent the diversity of farming systems throughout Ethiopia and capture climate di↵erences across the country. Stratified
random sampling is used within each village, based on whether households
have male or female heads.
The survey has several features that make it appropriate for the analysis.
The main attraction is its detailed information on individuals and the household, including time spent in the previous week working on the farm and in
the home. Furthermore, the sample is widely representative of rural Ethiopia,
giving it common support. That said, there are several concerns that arise
from the use of the survey. The first is attrition, which is a problem with all
panel data sets. However, attrition in the ERHS has been limited at 1–2% of
households per year (Dercon and Hoddinott, 2009). Nevertheless, if children
or households were to exit (or enter) the sample in a way that was correlated
with rainfall or climate variability, this would bias our results. A second concern is the small number of clusters in the context of village-level analysis. We
bootstrap-cluster our standard errors of our regressions to account for this. A
final concern is that the survey design includes an over-sample of households
considered to be at risk. This is unlikely to be too great a problem, however,
as weather is random and the survey covers a wide geographic area.
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the variables used in
the analysis.
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See figure 3 in appendix A for the location of these villages
The total survey consists of 7 rounds between 1989 and 2009. In 1989, households from
six villages in central and southern Ethiopia were interviewed. In 1994, however, the sample
was expanded to cover 15 villages across the country, representing 1477 households. Further
rounds were completed in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009.
11
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable
Dependent Variables
Child labour hours (total)
Child labour hours (farm)
Child labour hours (domestic)
Child labour participation (total)
Child labour participation (farm)
Child labour participation (domestic)
Idle
Not Attending
Discontinued
Zero Grades
Primary School Completed
Climate Variables
Climate Variability (annual)
Negative Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)
Individual Characteristics
Male
Age child
Youngest child
Grades (head)
Grades (spouse)
Household Characteristics
Days worked o↵-farm
Remittances received (birr)
Land (hectares)

Mean

Std. Dev.

N

27.55
13.93
13.73
0.96
0.65
0.75
0.01
0.10
0.03
0.16
0.09

16.71
15.17
12.85
0.17
0.47
0.42
0.11
0.29
0.18
0.37
0.29

4034
4015
4019
4034
4034
4034
4034
4034
4034
4034
4034

22.91
0.69

4.44
0.46

4034
4034

0.52
10.89
0.35
1.53
0.72

0.49
2.94
0.47
2.83
1.82

3726
4034
4034
4034
4034

11.56
134.12
1.36

27.06
1066.59
1.95

4034
4034
3603

In the analysis on the intensive margin, child labour – the dependent variable – is defined as the total hours spent working in economic activities and
chores per week. We define children to be aged between 6 and 16, consistent
with the literature. This is also consistent with the starting age of school in
Ethiopia so as not to amplify any e↵ect of variability on enrolment in school.
Economic activities generally consist of farming activities, including tending
crops, processing crops, looking after livestock, etc. Chores are also included
for two reasons. First, child labour is not restricted to economic activities.
Second, in rural areas it may be difficult to distinguish between time spent
on household chore activities and time spent preparing subsistence food crops.
From table 1 we can see that the average number of hours spent per week
on all child labour is just under 30 hours per week. This is a considerable
11

amount of time and is likely to result in a trade-o↵ with education and leisure.
Unfortunately, we are unable to identify time spent on education and leisure
to provide a full representation of time-use.12
The dependent variables used on the extensive margin analysis are whether
the child has attended school and whether the child participates in the labour
force (by activity). We observe that only 9% of the sample have completed
primary school and that 10% do not attend school. Furthermore, 16% of the
sample have zero grades.
While not a dependent variable, the grades of the parents are a variable
of interest. The average level of education attained by the parents in the
sample is considerably lower than that of their children, arguably a result of
the developments in education that have occurred over the last few decades.
Moreover, the average level of educational attainment for household heads is
reported as 1.43 years – just over twice the average level of attainment reported
for spouses (0.67 years).
69% of the villages experienced a drought between 2000 and 2009. This
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the village experienced rainfall one
standard deviation below the average rainfall for the village in the 5 years
prior to the survey.
In terms of household welfare, the average amount of land available for
cultivation by the household is just above 1 hectare. Ethiopia has a long
history of issues related to land titling and land registration, restricting the
sale or rent of land. Consequently, farmers might not use land efficiently,
or might not invest in the land to maximise its returns. It is clear that the
opportunities for o↵-farm work are also limited, the average number of days
spent working o↵-farm in the previous 12 months being around 11. This may
result from lack of opportunity in addition to factors relating to tenure security,
educational attainment, or labour market imperfections.
In addition to the household survey data, annual rainfall data has been constructed from daily precipitation reanalysis data at the village level from the
12

Ravallion and Wodon (2000) argue on a priori grounds that it would not be difficult
for parents to assure that a child working 20 hours per week could still attend school.
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ERA-Interim data archive supplied by the European Centre for Medium-Term
Weather Forecasting (ECMWF).13 Where previous studies have relied on the
use of meteorological data provided by the Ethiopian meteorological service,
the number of missing observations, or observations which are recorded as zero
on days when there are no records, is of concern. The ERA-Interim reanalysis data archive provides daily measurements of precipitation, temperature
(min, max, and mean), wind speed and wind direction, relative humidity, cloud
cover (a proxy for solar reflectance), and many other atmospheric parameters,
from January 1st 1979 until the present day, on a global grid of quadrilateral
cells defined by parallels and meridians at a resolution of 0.75 x 0.75 degrees
(equivalent to 83km x 83km at the equator).14 Reanalysis data is constructed
through a process whereby model information and observations are combined
to produce a consistent global best estimate of atmospheric parameters over
a long period of time by optimally fitting a dynamic model to each period simultaneously (Au↵hammer et al., 2013). Models propagate information from
areas with more observational data for areas in which observational data are
scarce. This results in an estimate of the climate system that is separated
uniformly across a grid, that is more uniform in its quality and realism than
observations alone, and that is closer to the state of existence than any model
would provide alone. This provides a consistent measure of atmospheric parameters over time and space. This type of data is increasingly being used by
economists (see Burgess et al., 2011; Guiteras, 2009; Hsiang et al., 2011; Kudamatsu, 2012; Schlenker & Lobell, 2010), as they fill in the gap in developing
countries, where the collection of consistent weather data is lower down the
priority list in government budgets.
By combining the ERHS data set with the ERA-interim data, we create
a unique panel allowing for microeconomic analysis of weather and climate in
Ethiopia.
It is important to note that all climate data, whether reanalysis or observa13

See Dee et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the ERA-Interim data.
To convert degrees to km, multiply 83 by the cosine of the latitude, e.g. at 40 degrees
latitude 0.75 x 0.75 cells are 83 x cos(40) = 63.5 km x 63.5 km.
14
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tional data, are subject to caveats and concerns. Reanalysis data is unlikely to
match observational data perfectly. It is limited to some degree by resolution,
even where observational data is present. Furthermore, reanalysis data are
partly computed using climate models that are imperfect and contain systematic biases. This brings up further concern to issues of accuracy. However,
in areas with limited observational data such as Ethiopia, reanalysis data is
known to provide estimates that are better than they otherwise could be, because the data is collected at intervals of six hours, over which time weather
follows physical laws in an almost linear fashion.
There are statistical reasons as to why reanalysis data may be preferable.
Previous studies have relied on the use of meteorological data provided by the
Ethiopian meteorological service and the number of missing observations is a
concern. This is exacerbated by the serious decline in the past few decades in
the number of weather stations around the world that are reporting. Lorenz
and Kuntsman (2012) show that since 1990 the number of reporting weather
stations in Africa has fallen from around 3,500 to around 500. With 54 countries in the continent, this results in an average of fewer than 10 weather stations per country. Looking at publicly available data, the number of stations in
Ethiopia included by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA) National Climatic Data Centre (NCDC) is 18; however, if we were
to apply a selection rule that required observations for 365 days this would
yield a database with zero observations. For the two years for which we have
economic data (2004 and 2009), weather station data is available for 50 days
from one station (Addis Ababa) in 2004 and is available for all 18 stations
for an average of 200 days (minimum of 67 days, maximum of 276 days) in
2009. This is likely to result in a huge increase in measurement error when
this data is used to interpolate across the 63 zones and 529 woredas (districts)
reported in 2008. If this measurement error is classical, i.e., uncorrelated with
the actual level of rainfall measured, then our estimates of the e↵ect of these
variables will be biased towards zero. However, given the sparse density of stations across ethiopia (an average of 0.03 stations per woreda), the placement
of stations is likely to be correlated with agricultural output, i.e., weather sta14

tions are placed in more agriculturally productive areas, where the need for
weather information is greater.
Rainfall at each village is calculated by taking data points within 100km of
the village and then interpolated through a process of inverse distance weighting. Taking the annual measure of rainfall at each village, we calculate the
coefficient of variation for rainfall, measured as the standard deviation divided
by the mean for the periods 1995–2004 and 2000–2009.
We focus on rainfall data for our measures of village risk and shocks, as the
data is both spatially and temporally rich, providing an exogenous measure
over a long period of time that is ideal for working with longitudinal data.
While weather events and shocks are not the only exogenous factor influencing variability in agricultural output and income, it is arguably the factor that
contributes the most to income fluctuations, leading to welfare changes (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1993). This is especially true of Ethiopia, where
agriculture accounts for such a large proportion of GDP and employment.
Furthermore, it is important to gain a better understanding of the impact of
weather risk and shocks on behaviour and decision-making, given the risks
that climate change poses to many developing countries. This is key to understanding how current development policy is compatible with adaptation needs
in response to climate change, and where gaps in policy arise.
Table 2 reports the mean rainfall for each village for each year of the panel,
and the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation over the entire
period.
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Table 2: Annual Rainfall (mm) by Peasant Authority and Year
Peasant Association

2004

2009

mean

std. dev.

CV

Haresaw
Geblen
Dinki
Yetmen
Shumsheha
Sirbana Godeti
Adele Keke
Korodegaga
Turfe Kechemane
Imbidir
Aze Deboa
Addado
Gara Godo
Doma
Debre Berhan Villages

395
226
810
667
535
1150
1175
1478
1170
1051
1232
1258
1546
1134
838

470
261
865
713
627
1218
1169
1589
1177
1062
1253
1399
1520
1270
893

476
278
853
740
645
1086
1008
1364
1024
936
1073
1188
1318
1070
855

155
95
162
149
150
172
177
218
197
158
210
305
271
257
154

33.12
34.24
18.61
20.00
23.34
15.61
17.19
15.6
18.86
16.68
19.08
25.29
20.16
23.71
17.53

The mean, std. dev. and CV are calculated for the period 1980-2009.

Rainfall is low and erratic in Ethiopia. From table 2, we observe that there
is considerable variability across the villages as well as between years. The
average across all the villages is just under 1000mm per annum, but there is
considerable heterogeneity. For example, Haresaw and Geblen, villages from
the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia, experienced on average 400mm per
annum between 1980 and 2009. Figure 1 in appendix A provides a visualisation
of the inter-annual heterogeneity in rainfall, as well as a demonstration of the
degree to which the villages in the sample represent the average climate of
Ethiopia. Figure 2 in appendix A shows density plots for the coefficient of
variation over the two periods for which we have economic data, demonstrating
the temporal variation we observe, even in a short time frame. Figures 4 and 5
in the appendix provide a visualisation of the spatial heterogeneity in average
rainfall and variability.
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5

Empirical Specification and Identification
Strategy

This paper investigates how future income uncertainty, drawn from historical
rainfall variability, a↵ects child labour and human capital accumulation on
the intensive and extensive margin. We employ the coefficient of variation in
rainfall (hereafter CV), measured as the standard deviation of rainfall divided
by the mean for the previous ten years, as an exogenous determinant of the
level of risk that households face. Unlike the variance or standard deviation of
rainfall, the CV is scale invariant, providing a comparable measure of variation
for households that may have very di↵erent income levels (Fitzsimons, 2007).15
Using these measures, we examine the impact of climate variability on
child labour hours (the intensive margin), the probability that children attend
school, educational attainment (measured as grades attained), and the probability that the children participate in labour activities (the extensive margin). We use the di↵erence-in-means estimation approach (i.e., fixed-e↵ects
or “within” regression), which allows us to address the issue of time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, captured by village fixed e↵ects.
The use of cross-sectional data does not address this issue, leading to potential omitted-variable bias due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
correlated with the treatment e↵ect or the dependent variable. Examples of
this unobserved heterogeneity in the context of our paper might include the
geography of the village, access to markets, infrastructure such as schools and
roads, and access to insurance against covariate shocks, such as food for work
programmes.
In addition to village fixed e↵ects, we control for year fixed e↵ects to control
for aggregate shocks, economic development, and macroeconomic policies. We
also include month fixed e↵ects to control for any seasonal variation in the
timing of the survey. Fitzsimons (2007) argues that it is not unrealistic to
imagine that households in riskier villages have lower preferences for education;
15

It is important to note that our results are robust to using the standard deviation of
rainfall and other time measures of the CV.
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however, unlike Fitzsimons (2007), who uses a cross-sectional instrumental
variable approach, we are able to control for these factors. Indeed, it is well
established that family preferences for education are a major determinant of
educational attainment (Heckman, 2007; 2008).
A main concern surrounding the empirical specification of the model is the
number of zeros in the child labour data, as it implies that the dependent
variable is not normally distributed, leading to inconsistent and inefficient
estimates under the Gaussian assumptions of linear regression. To account for
the large number of zeroes in the dependent variables, we estimate a fixede↵ects Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator model (QMLE)16 with
cluster-robust Huber-White standard errors at the village level to account for
serial correlation within villages. 17
The model is estimated using the following specification:
E(yihvt ) = µv (exp( cvvt + X0iht + ↵t + ↵m )

(1)

where subscripts index individuals (i), households (h), village (v) and year
(t).
yihvt corresponds to the number of child labour hours for child i in
household h (located in village v) in year t. CVvt corresponds to the coefficient
of variation at the village level, our measure of village risk. In addition to these
core variables, we include a set of controls and characteristics, X, measured
at the individual, household, and village level. µv corresponds to the village
fixed e↵ects and ↵t to the year fixed e↵ects. We interpret the coefficients
in equation 4 as the semi-elasticity of child labour (or grades attained) in
response to a unit change in the variable.
As the village-level fixed e↵ect (µv ) is multiplicative to the rainfall variables, this makes households with higher levels of child labour more responsive
18
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See Hausman et al. (1984), Wooldridge (1999; 2010) for an introduction to the model,
and Burgess et al. (2011) and Vanden Eynde (2011) for recent applications. See Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) for an evaluation of the di↵erences between OLS and QMLE Poisson.
17
Our results are robust to OLS specifications in logs and levels, presented in appendix
B.
18
For the analysis of enrolment and labour force participation, we estimate fixed-e↵ects
linear probability models.
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to climate variability or shocks. As a result, the fixed e↵ects explain all the
variation in households that do not have any child labour, therefore these
households do not contribute towards the estimation of the coefficients.
There are a number of benefits to using the Poisson QMLE instead of the
standard Poisson MLE. For example, the use of the QMLE does not require
that the data follow a Poisson distribution. All that is required is that the
conditional mean of the variable of interest be correctly specified. A further
benefit in the context of Poisson models is the mitigation of concerns surrounding under- and over-dispersion. This is because, unlike the MLE, the Poisson
QMLE does not assume equi-dispersion. All that is required for optimality
of the Poisson QMLE is that the conditional variance is proportional to the
conditional mean. Furthermore, the Poisson QMLE will still be consistent in
the case where the conditional variance is not proportional to the conditional
mean. This means that we can work using a fixed-e↵ects framework without
needing to use models such as the negative-binomial or zero-inflation Poisson
MLE to deal with consistency issues.
Due to the grouped nature of our data, it is likely that the standard errors
will be underestimated, resulting in overstated t-statistics. We account for
this by clustering the standard errors by group, i.e., at the village level. The
importance of clustering is emphasised by Moulton (1986; 1990), and more
recently by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). We cluster at the village
level in line with Pepper (2002) and Bertrand et al. (2004), who argue that
one should cluster at the highest level where there may be correlation. In our
context, we are examining individuals, in a household, which is part of the
larger village community. As the variation in climate is measured for each
village, we want to cluster at this level.
However, Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), Angrist and Pischke
(2009) and Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) show that when group size
is below 30 clusters, asymptotic tests can over-reject the null hypothesis. As
a consequence, the use of block bootstrap methods to account for clustering at the village level results in more consistent estimators and asymptotic
refinement.
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In addition to concerns about the empirical specification, there are a number of caveats related to the data and identification strategy that need to be
discussed and, where possible, addressed.
A general concern is measurement error, especially considering the retrospective nature of the survey methods used (Deaton, 1997). This may be a
particular issue regarding the dependent variable, which measures the number
of hours of child labour. For example, there may be general reporting error
due to recall, or hours at lower levels of work being rounded up, e.g., 30 mins
becomes one hour. It may also be the case that richer, more educated households deliberately under-report child labour due to a greater understanding
of the stigma attached. While this should not bias the results, if we believe
that this measurement error is classical, and that any non-classical measurement error is fixed over time, it could increase the size of the standard errors,
increasing the risk of type II errors in which we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Given cultural attitudes towards child labour, however, it is likely that
concerns about stigma are less than in other contexts.
While measurement error in the dependent variable is possible, this is less
of a concern than in the main explanatory variable, CV, which would lead to
inconsistent estimation and downward-biased estimates of 1 . We minimise
classical measurement error associated with self-reported data by using the
CV, which is measured using quality-controlled meteorological data, as a direct
measure of income risk, rather than using an instrumental variable approach,
as in Fitzsimmons (2007). However, all meteorological data is measured with
some error and so we expect our coefficients to be a lower-bound estimate.
The use of rainfall variables has become increasingly popular in economics
as a means of identifying permanent and transitory components of income,
as well as income variability. The main advantages of rainfall as a proxy
or as an instrumental variable are its strong correlation with income and its
presumably random variation. This variation is presumed to be orthogonal
to other unobserved determinants of income, o↵ering a potential solution to
omitted-variable bias problems. In e↵ect, it is argued that rainfall has no
e↵ect on the dependent variable other than through income. Indeed, the key
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identifying assumption of this paper is that historical climate variability is
exogenous to recent child labour and educational decisions, i.e., the only way
in which rainfall has an e↵ect on child labour and educational decisions is
through village risk.
However, the e↵ect of weather on permanent and transitory income are
based on theoretical frameworks with strong assumptions about the operation
of rural labour and land markets, preferences, and technology. Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (2000) argue that the assumption of orthogonality with other unobserved determinants may be overly strong. This is a concern noted in Fitzsimons (2007), and also aired here. While a fixed-e↵ects estimation approach
controls for time-invariant omitted variables, we are still concerned about timevariant omitted variables that may impact child labour and schooling decisions
and are also correlated with our measure of income risk. For example, rainfall shocks may have resulted in disasters that caused damage to schools or
infrastructure, directly a↵ecting school attendance and child labour decisions.
As a result of this, we control for whether the village has experienced a rainfall shock in the previous five years. We are confident with this measure as,
unlike other studies in which the data on shocks is subject to the caveat that
it is self-reported, our measure is based on a quality-controlled meteorological
measurement.
On a similar note, past rainfall may have a↵ected the labour market decisions of other household members, leading to o↵-farm labour supply as an
attempt to diversify the income portfolio. To control for this, we include
whether household members are engaged in o↵-farm labour, measured as the
number of days worked o↵-farm in the previous 12 months. However, due to
labour market imperfections or general equilibrium e↵ects, this may not be an
e↵ective method of diversifying risk. For example, Jayachandran (2006) shows
that productivity shocks depress wages by more when workers are poorer, less
able to migrate, and more credit-constrained because of the inelasticity of these
workers’ labour supply. Macours et al. (2012) conducted a randomized control
trial in Nicaragua and found that a conditional cash transfer allowed households in rural areas to diversify out of agriculture, increasing mean income by
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8% and increasing resilience to droughts.
It is more likely that past rainfall may have a↵ected the labour market decisions of household members through the channel of migration or by marrying
o↵ family members to other villages in order to diversify covariate risk. Indeed,
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show that marriage with migration significantly
reduces the variation in household food consumption and that households subject to more variable income tend to engage more in longer-distance marriage
with migration. In relation to labour market decisions, Bryan, Chowdhury
and Mobarak (2012) randomly assign a small cash transfer, equivalent to the
cost of travel, to out-migrate during the famine season in Bangladesh. They
report that this transfer induces 22% of households to send a family member
to migrate, that consumption of the family members with a migrant increases
by 30%, and that the e↵ect of this one-time transfer is persistent with positive spillover e↵ects: the migration rate is 10 percentage points higher in year
2, and 8 percentage points higher in year 3. We control for these potential
factors as much as we can through the remittances received by the household.
In addition, strong regionalisation in Ethiopia means it is very difficult to obtain work outside of your locality, this further mitigates such concerns about
migration behaviour.

6

Results and Discussion

In this section we present and discuss the results, examining the e↵ect of
climate variability on child labour (total, farming, and domestic chores) and
educational outcomes (whether the children have enrolled).

6.1

Child Labour: The Intensive Margin

The e↵ects of climate variability on the number of hours worked by children
is estimated using the di↵erence-in-means fixed-e↵ects framework through the
Poisson QMLE model.
Turning first to table 3, we examine the e↵ects of climate variability on
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the number of hours worked using the specification from equation (4). We observe that an increase in weather risk increases the number of hours worked in
farming and decreases the number of hours worked in the home. This results
in the net e↵ect of weather risk on child labour being zero. This is demonstrated in column 3, which examines total child labour. This emphasises the
importance of looking at the e↵ect or risk on child labour activities separately,
in order to observe substitution of labour across activities. Given the small
number of clusters observed in our data set (15 villages) we bootstrap-cluster
the standard errors in order to provide the most robust classification of the
standard errors. This is important as it is more likely that the null hypothesis
will be rejected when the number of clusters is small.
Following the discussion at the end of section 5, we interpret these results
as the semi-elasticity of child labour in response to a unit change in an explanatory variable. The Poisson QMLE fixed-e↵ects model is non-linear, and
so these results are dependent on the coefficient and on the expected value of
the number of hours worked, conditional on the coefficient. Consequently, the
larger the value of E(y|x), the larger the rate of change in E(y|x).
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Table 3: Number of Hours Worked by Children
(1)
Child Labour
(Farm)

(2)
Child Labour
(Home)

(3)
Child Labour
(Total)

Climate Variability

0.0406***
(0.0128)

-0.0291***
(0.00667)

0.00814
(0.00774)

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

-0.000899
(0.0874)

0.0383
(0.0338)

0.0242
(0.0522)

Male

1.070***
(0.0825)

-0.946***
(0.109)

0.0358
(0.0312)

Age

0.104**
(0.0420)

0.150***
(0.0345)

0.129***
(0.0164)

Age2

-0.00427**
(0.00182)

-0.00514***
(0.00160)

-0.00478***
(0.000717)

Grades (Head)

0.00481
(0.00751)

-0.00600
(0.0110)

-0.00155
(0.00750)

Grades (Spouse)

-0.0116
(0.0123)

-0.00898
(0.0104)

-0.00905
(0.00875)

Log Remittances

-0.00927
(0.00608)

0.0109
(0.00698)

0.00132
(0.00335)

Log Days Worked O↵-Farm

-0.0129
(0.00828)

-0.0130
(0.0122)

-0.00922
(0.00787)

Land (Hectares)

0.0283**
(0.0141)

0.00133
(0.00735)

0.0137
(0.00840)

Yes

Yes

Yes

3,212
-25,145.945

3,213
-20,179.375

3,222
-21,639.531

Fixed E↵ects
Observations
Log-Likelihood

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the
village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

We observe that a one-unit increase in the CV is associated with a 4%
increase in the number of hours worked on the farm. Referring to table 1, a
one standard deviation change in the CV is 4.44 units. As such, a one standard
deviation change in the CV is associated with a 17.76 percentage point increase
in the number of hours worked on the farm. To give more structure to the
interpretation of this e↵ect, we compare the di↵erence across villages using the
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values provided in table 2. We see that the community with the smallest CV
is Korodegaga (15.60), and the village with the largest CV is Geblen (34.24).
From the results in table 3, we might expect that the average level of farming
child labour in Geblen is 62.4% higher than in Korodegaga.19 We observe
that, for domestic child labour, a one-unit increase in the CV results in a
2.9% decrease in child labour in the home. This is especially interesting, as
it indicates that there is some substitution between activities in response to
increased variability, emphasising the importance of measuring child labour
based on di↵erent activities as opposed to aggregate measures, as discussed
in Beegle et al. (2006). Climate variability may result in more work in the
planting and cultivation stages of agriculture in order to minimise losses in the
event of a shock: an increase in the intensive margin of labour supply. A one
standard deviation change in the CV is associated with a 12.7% decrease in
the number of hours worked in the home. Furthermore, a comparison between
Geblen and Korodegaga reveals that, on average, the expected level of child
labour in the home is 54.05% less in Korodegaga.
With regard to the other coefficients, we see that age has a significant positive e↵ect on the level of child labour across all activities, but at a diminishing
rate. This may be an indication of the increasing productivity of children in
the home (due to child-care responsibilities increasing with age) and on the
farm (due to increased productivity on manual tasks as children develop).
In addition to age e↵ects, we observe significant gender e↵ects. The number
of hours worked in farming is increasing for boys, while decreasing in domestic
chores by a similar magnitude. This indicates that households may allocate
tasks in accordance with potential comparative advantages.
While these results are reduced-form and do not indicate the precise mechanism through which climate variability increases child labour on the farm,
our results indicate that it may have a significant impact on household timeallocation decisions. The fact that climate variability has an e↵ect on the
number of hours of child labour indicates, from our theoretical framework,
that households may invest more child labour in farming to minimise losses in
19

(34.24 - 15.6) x 0.04 = 0.624
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the event of a shock. To understand whether this is merely a change in the
intensive margin of child labour supply, with time being allocated di↵erently
across activities without a reduction in education on the extensive margin,
we must understand the e↵ects of climate variability on enrolment and labour
force participation.

6.2

School and Labour Force Participation:
The Extensive Margin

From a policy perspective, part of the concern related to child labour relates
to the degree that it crowds out educational attainment. As we have observed,
climate variability is associated with an increase in child labour on the farm,
and a decrease in child labour in the home. Given this substitution, it is of
interest to understand whether there are also changes on the extensive margin.
An increase in participation, above and beyond the changes in the intensive
margin, may have an impact on education if the substitution of activities on the
intensive margin is not able to account for the full adjustment. In examining
the e↵ects of climate variability on education, we first explore whether climate
variability increases the probability that children participate in child labour
activities and whether it increases the likelihood that these children either do
not attend or delay entry into school, as discussed by Fitzsimons (2007) and
Kazianga (2012)).
Table 4 presents results from linear probability models examining the impact of climate variability on participation in child labour on the farm, in the
home, and whether the child participates in any child labour.
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Table 4: Participation in child labour activities - the extensive margin
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Home)

(3)
Child Labour (Total)

Climate Variability

0.0165**
(0.00783)

-0.00336
(0.00866)

-0.000786
(0.00246)

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

-0.00187
(0.0336)

-0.0657
(0.0520)

0.0132
(0.0154)

Male

0.391***
(0.0211)

-0.326***
(0.0362)

-0.0221***
(0.00490)

Age

0.0509***
(0.0157)

0.0509**
(0.0231)

0.0544***
(0.0104)

Age2

-0.00209***
(0.000705)

-0.00212**
(0.000989)

-0.00225***
(0.000439)

Grades (Head)

0.0146***
(0.00379)

0.00584*
(0.00331)

0.00117
(0.00123)

Grades (Spouse)

0.00000907
(0.00962)

-0.00132
(0.00386)

0.00186
(0.00120)

Log Remittances

-0.00567
(0.00556)

0.00743***
(0.00262)

0.00163
(0.00129)

Log Days Worked O↵-Farm

-0.00392
(0.00600)

-0.00695
(0.00430)

0.000673
(0.00269)

Land (Hectares)

0.00983**
(0.00443)

-0.00279
(0.00584)

-0.000141
(0.00133)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2

3222
0.180

3222
0.166

3222
0.023

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05
*** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of
clusters.

We observe that there is very little impact on the extensive margin other
than for child labour on the farm. This indicates that most of the adjustment
takes place on the intensive margin, i.e., that households are able to substitute
time across activities.
In examining the e↵ect of risk on the propensity to not attend or delay
entry into school, we present results from linear probability models (table 5).
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Table 5: Education, Education, Education - the extensive margin
(1)
Not Attending

(2)
Never Attended

(3)
Zero Grades

(4)
Grades Completed

Climate Variability

-0.00460
(0.00989)

0.00272
(0.00176)

-0.00824
(0.0117)

-0.0207
(0.0787)

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

0.0271
(0.0604)

-0.0234
(0.0163)

-0.0109
(0.0786)

-0.162
(0.383)

Male

0.000895
(0.00963)

-0.00111
(0.00716)

-0.0170
(0.0278)

0.0447
(0.141)

Age

-0.0644***
(0.0165)

-0.00228
(0.00513)

-0.144***
(0.0172)

0.704***
(0.0859)

Age2

0.00214***
(0.000583)

0.0000797
(0.000245)

0.00522***
(0.000674)

-0.00966**
(0.00394)

Grades (Head)

0.00114
(0.000977)

-0.000899
(0.000587)

-0.00594
(0.00419)

0.0637***
(0.0169)

Grades (Spouse)

-0.00856***
(0.00265)

-0.00114
(0.00107)

-0.0139***
(0.00255)

0.0803***
(0.0284)

Log Remittances

-0.00214
(0.00139)

0.000364
(0.00140)

-0.00123
(0.00316)

-0.0153
(0.0274)

Log Days Worked O↵-Farm

0.00407
(0.00336)

0.00210
(0.00167)

0.00253
(0.00461)

-0.0419
(0.0342)

Land (Hectares)

0.00476
(0.00506)

-0.00246
(0.00217)

0.00180
(0.00460)

0.00681
(0.0326)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2

2959
0.070

2484
-0.004

3222
0.123

3222
0.399

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05
*** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of
clusters.

Table 5 shows that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that climate variability has no e↵ect on the decision to enrol children in school, nor
on educational attainment. This is plausible given the adjustment along the
intensive margin. In addition, as argued by Fitzsimons (2007), this could indicate that households in riskier villages have lower preferences for education,
which is captured by the village fixed e↵ects. If we restrict the sample to be
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cross-sectional (for 2004 or 2009) we are able to replicate the results observed
in Fitzsimons (2007), i.e., that the variability decreases the probability that
children attend school. We present these cross-sectional results in table 6.
Table 6: Education, Education, Education - the extensive margin (Crosssection)
(1)
(2004)
Zero Grades

(2)
(2009)
Zero Grades

(3)
(2004)
Grades Attained

(4)
(2009)
Grades Attained

-0.00560
(0.00612)

-0.0285***
(0.00717)

0.258***
(0.0556)

0.172***
(0.0284)

–

0.0618
(0.0513)

–

-0.610**
(0.292)

Village Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1615
0.077

1607
0.321

1615
0.402

1607
0.496

Climate Variability

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

Observations
Adjusted R2

Notes: In 2004 village shocks in the previous 5 years was omitted as all villages had experienced at
least one shock. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Significance levels are indicated as *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to
account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small
number of clusters.

While there is little evidence to support the impact of climate variability
on enrolment, there may be an impact on the intensive margin. It is likely to
be the case that time is allocated away from informal educational experiences
such as homework and out-of-school tutoring. However, without data on time
allocation within education, we cannot estimate the elasticity of education
with respect to child labour to evaluate a precise trade-o↵.

7

Supporting Evidence

In order to demonstrate the robustness of the results, we consider a number
of additional extensions and robustness checks to try to validate our measure
of climate variability and isolate the channel observed in the reduced form
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results. In appendix C, we present additional mechanical robustness checks
and stress tests.

7.1

Spreading the Burden

First, we test our hypothesis that households spread the burden of labour
across children. If we believe that the households’ utility is increasing in
education, then it is also possible that they may try to smooth the burden
of child labour across children to mitigate the impact on education. This
might explain in part why we observe no average e↵ect of climate variability
on enrolment.
We explore this potential in a number of ways. First, we look at the
degree to which the opportunity of spreading the burden across children is
available to households by looking at interactions between whether the child
has any siblings and climate variability. Although we note that family size
is endogenous in this context and, as such, cannot be argued to be causal, it
does help to motivate the narrative. In order to deal with this endogeneity
issue, we also examine the interaction between climate variability and being
the eldest child. While the number of children is endogenous, sibling order is
not. The argument made to support this channel is based on the idea that
at the time when decisions about educating the eldest child were being made,
there was no substitute child labour available and so consequently the burden
of labour fell on the eldest child. This allows for multiple sibling families, but
accounts for the fact that younger siblings would not have engaged in child
labour, or would not have been productive in the same way at such a young
age.
We first report the results on the number of siblings and then the results
on sibling order. We test the first hypothesis by interacting climate variability
with a dummy variable equal to one if the child has no siblings and zero if the
child has one or more siblings.
As we observe in table 7, while climate variability itself is insignificant, the
interaction term is significant at the 1% level. From column (1), we observe
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that if a child has no siblings, then a one standard deviation increase in the
coefficient of variation (4.44) increases the probability that the child does not
attend school by 2.2 percentage points. As above, if we compare Geblen and
Korodegaga, we observe that the probability of not attending school is just
over 9% more likely in Geblen if a child has zero siblings relative than if a
child has one or more siblings. In terms of educational attainment, we observe
from column (4) that a one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of
variation (4.44) reduces grade attainment by 0.2 grades. In comparing Geblen
and Korodegaga, we observe a reduction in grades close to 1 (0.85). While this
does not seem like a particularly large e↵ect, we argue that this is the impact
of uncertainty, not the realisation of a shock.
Table 7: Education, Education, Education - Sibling Interaction
(1)
Not Attending

(2)
Never Attended

(3)
Zero Grades

(4)
Grades Completed

Climate Variability

-0.00553
(0.0106)

0.00207
(0.00134)

-0.00219
(0.00789)

0.00830
(0.0669)

No Siblings

-0.132***
(0.0411)

-0.0804***
(0.0279)

-0.115*
(0.0635)

0.943**
(0.475)

0.00509***
(0.00164)

0.00301***
(0.00105)

0.00452*
(0.00231)

-0.0457**
(0.0179)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2

2,959
0.071

2,747
-0.003

3,222
0.045

2,959
0.415

Climate Variability ⇥ No Siblings

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level
(1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns
over the small number of clusters.

As discussed, we try to deal with the potential endogeneity concerns by
considering interactions with the ordering of children. The following table
examines the interaction between climate variability and being the eldest child.
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Table 8: Education, Education, Education - Eldest Child Interaction
(1)
Not Attending

(2)
Never Attended

(3)
Zero Grades

(4)
Grades Completed

Climate Variability

-0.00923
(0.0103)

0.00120
(0.00190)

-0.0124
(0.0117)

-0.00715
(0.0773)

Eldest

-0.255***
(0.0658)

-0.0899***
(0.0262)

-0.218**
(0.102)

0.745
(0.561)

0.00961***
(0.00259)

0.00335***
(0.000986)

0.00882**
(0.00396)

-0.0290
(0.0224)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2

2959
0.079

2484
0.000

3222
0.126

3222
0.399

Climate Variability ⇥ Eldest

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 ***
0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village
level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to
concerns over the small number of clusters.

From table 8, we observe again that, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis that climate variability has no e↵ect on educational outcomes, the
interaction with a dummy variable, equal to one if the child is the eldest sibling, and zero otherwise, is significant at the 1% level. From column (1), we
observe that if a child is the eldest sibling, then a one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of variation (4.44) increases the probability that the
child does not attend school by 4.2 percentage points. As above, if we compare Geblen and Korodegaga, we observe that the probability of not attending
school is just over 17.9% more likely in Geblen if a child is the eldest sibling.
While the channel through which this e↵ect occurs is not conclusive (it
could simply be the case that elder children are more productive and so are
more likely to be used in child labour), this evidence, in addition to the results
on the number of siblings, is supportive of an argument in which households
spread the burden of labour across children.
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7.2

Seasonal Variability

An important placebo test is to check whether climate variability outside of the
agricultural season has an e↵ect on child labour. In order to be a good measure
of future income uncertainty, climate variability outside of the agricultural
season should not be an important determinant.
Table 9: Seasonal Measures of Climate Variability
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Chores)

(3)
Child Labour (Total)

Climate VariabilityBelg

0.004*
(0.002)

-0.007***
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.002)

Climate VariabilityKiremt

0.0209*
(0.012)

-0.009
(0.007)

0.005
(0.005)

Climate VariabilityBega

0.023
(0.022)

-0.022
(0.019)

0.000
(0.014)

Fixed E↵ects

YES

YES

YES

Observations

3,212

3,213

3,222

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Each variable corresponds to a separate regression
e.g. one using the Belg season measure, a second using the Kiremt season measure and finally a third
using the Bega season measure. Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions
include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000
replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns
over the small number of clusters.

As table 9 shows, the Bega (Dry) season is not an important determinant
of child labour, while the Belg and Kiremt rainy seasons are. Interestingly, we
observe that the Belg season shows the most evidence of substitution along the
intensive margin. This would be consistent with a story of risk-management,
as the Belg season is when critical decision-making for agriculture occurs. The
Kiremt season is associated with the flowering phases of plant growth and final
harvesting.
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8

Conclusions

The objective of this paper was to evaluate the extent to which future income uncertainty, proxied by climate variability, influences household decisionmaking in the context of child labour and human capital accumulation. We
observe that climate variability has a significant e↵ect on the number of hours
that children work on the farm (the intensive margin), with substitution of
time from child labour in the home to child labour on the farm. Contrary to
previous research, there is no e↵ect of climate variability on enrolment in school
or educational attainment. The only e↵ect we find on the extensive margin is
that children are more likely to participate in child labour on the farm. This
may be motivated by households’ e↵orts to spread the burden across children
to reduce the impact on education and leisure. This mechanism is supported
by results which indicate that increased climate variability decreases the probability that children attend school for children with no siblings. This channel
is further supported by examining the interaction between climate variability
and sibling order, to deal with endogeneity concerns surrounding family size
and child labour.
Results on the intensive margin of child labour supply indicate that increased climate variability increases the number of hours worked on the farm
with decreases in the number of hours worked in the home. This indication
of substitution between activities emphasises the importance of distinguishing between activities when examining the determinants of child labour, as
discussed by Beegle et al. (2006). We argue that households form expectations about the likelihood of future income shocks based on the variability of
the climate. We posit that, in order to manage this risk, households increase
child labour on the farm ex ante to minimise losses in the event that income
shocks should occur in the future. This hypothesis, supported by our results,
contrasts with recent work by Fitzsimons (2007) and Kazianga (2012), who
argue that households do not enrol children in school in an ex ante response
to future income risk, as a precautionary savings mechanism. We show that
the results from these studies are likely to be the artefact of the cross-sectional
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data used. However, this is not to say that climate variability has no e↵ect
on human capital accumulation. Without time-allocation data on education,
we are unable to observe the e↵ects of increased child labour on the amount
of time spent in school and on more informal educational investments, such as
homework and external tutoring, which may limit participation in education
at later levels.
These results emphasise the importance of understanding ex ante as well
as ex post responses to fully understand the risk-management practices of
households. While this paper focusses on a representative sample of rural
Ethiopia, we are not able to examine the e↵ects of weather risk in urban
areas, as in Fitzsimons (2007). Consequently, our conclusions may have limited
external validity to Ethiopia as a whole; however, it is unlikely that urban areas
will be a↵ected by future income uncertainty, proxied by climate variability, as
shown in Alem and Colmer (2013). Overall, the results suggest that climate
variability may be an important factor in household decisions related to child
labour and investment in human capital, pointing to the need for more research
into the socio-economic impacts of climate change across a broad range of
economic and policy contexts.
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Appendices - For Online Publication
The Following Appendices are displayed in three parts. Appendix A presents
a series of Maps and Charts references in the Main text. Appendix B presents
regression tables for OLS specifications referred to in the main text. Appendix
C presents a series of mechanical robustness tests that demonstrate the validity
of our results to alternative specifications and outliers.

Appendix A - Maps, and Graphs
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Appendix A presents a series of graphs and maps that have been referenced to
in section 2 of the main text. It also provides the complete table of descriptive
statistics referred to in the data description.
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Figure 1: Di↵erences in the average annual rainfall of the villages and Ethiopia
as a whole.
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Figure 2: Di↵erences in the Coefficient of Variation across villages between
the two time periods.

Figure 3: The ERHS Villages (Dercon & Hoddinott, 2009)
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Figure 4: Average Annual Rainfall (1979-2011)

Figure 5: The Coefficient of Variation (1979-2011)
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Appendix B - OLS Results and Conditional Logit Specifications
Table A1: Number of Hours Worked by Children - Intensive Margin (OLS logs)
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Home)

(3)
Child Labour (Total)

0.0543**
(0.0228)

-0.0189
(0.0239)

0.00823
(0.0129)

0.0230
(0.120)

-0.0989
(0.142)

0.0597
(0.0809)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2

3212
0.236

3213
0.259

3222
0.038

Climate Variability

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 ***
0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village
level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to
concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table A2: Number of Hours Worked by Children - Intensive Margin (OLS levels)
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Home)

(3)
Child Labour (Total)

0.556***
(0.172)

-0.326***
(0.121)

0.211
(0.249)

-0.223
(1.545)

0.471
(0.747)

0.367
(1.462)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2

3212
0.211

3213
0.256

3222
0.024

Climate Variability

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 ***
0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village
level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to
concerns over the small number of clusters.

5

Appendix C - Robustness Checks
In addition to our main results we consider a series of robustness checks. We
begin by removing outliers from the number of hours worked to establish that
the results are not determined by these. We do this by limiting the number
of hours worked in each activity to an average of 8 hours per day, then 6
hours per day, and finally 4 hours per day. A second robustness check explores
alternative measures of climate variability. The first alternative specification
uses the standard deviation of rainfall over the same period. We also consider
seasonal measures of the CV and the CV measured over a 5 year period.
Finally, we examine whether the relationship between climate variability and
child labour is characterised by non-linearities.
We begin by examining the e↵ects of removing outliers on our results,
firstly in the dependent variable, and then in our coefficient of interest, climate
variability.
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Table A3: Removal of Dependent Variable Outliers

Max 8 hours
Climate Variability

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

Fixed E↵ects
Observations
Log-Likelihood
Max 6 hours
Climate Variability

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

Fixed E↵ects
Observations
Log-Likelihood
Max 4 hours
Climate Variability

Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)

Fixed E↵ects
Observations
Log-Likelihood

(1)
Farming

(2)
Chores

(3)
Total

0.0506***
(0.0126)

-0.0290***
(0.0105)

0.0132*
(0.00793)

-0.0152
(0.0800)

0.0527
(0.0638)

0.0152
(0.0528)

Yes

Yes

Yes

3,044
-21,796.89

3,044
-17,698.988

3,044
-17,765.703

0.0312*
(0.0174)

-0.0234
(0.0159)

0.00468
(0.0113)

0.0678
(0.101)

0.0204
(0.0991)

0.0368
(0.0716)

Yes

Yes

Yes

2,735
-17,168.882

2,735
-15,043.177

2,735
-13,889.686

0.0149
(0.0214)

-0.00761
(0.0172)

0.00525
(0.00878)

0.214
(0.147)

-0.0203
(0.116)

0.0657
(0.0644)

Yes

Yes

Yes

2025
-10,595.168

2025
-10,152.128

2025
-8,678.135

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are
indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls
as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000
replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village
level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table A3 indicates that our results are fairly robust to outliers. We observe
that child labour in all areas remains significant and of a similar magnitude
when the number of hours are restricted to a maximum of 8 per day. These
results hold for child labour on the farm when we restrict the number of hours
further to 6. Once the sample is restricted to 4 hours, the CV for the separate
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activities become insignificant.
Table A4 removes potential outliers in our explanatory variable. We begin
by dropping the village with the highest climate variability, Geblen. In the
next test, we drop the village with the lowest climate variability, Korodegaga.
In the final test, we drop both villages.
Table A4: Removal of Explanatory Variable Outliers
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Chores)

(3)
Child LabTotal

0.0400*
(0.0238)

-0.0266**
(0.0122)

0.00844
(0.0133)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

3,057

3,058

3,067

0.0235
(0.0172)

-0.0198**
(0.00919)

0.00489
(0.00957)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

3079

3079

3088

0.0240
(0.0231)

-0.0174
(0.0118)

0.00602
(0.0127)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2,924

2,924

2,933

Geblen Removed
Climate Variability

Korodegaga Removed
Climate Variability

Both Removed
Climate Variability

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are
bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and
clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

While the results remain significant when dropping Geblen, we lose the
significance of the result examining child labour on the farm when we drop
Korodegaga. However, the result is very imprecise and so indicates that it
may be due to measurement error and a reduction in variation than being a
zero e↵ect. One we drop both villages we lose significance for all the results,
this is unsurprising given how much variation is removed.
Table A5 presents results based on alternative time specifications of the
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coefficient of variation, ranging from 2 – 10 years. The results shown present
a reasonably consistent magnitude and significance over di↵erent temporal
scales, weakening as the time period becomes smaller in which it is likely that
the measure becomes more highly correlated with weather shocks.
Table A5: Alternative Temporal Specifications of Climate Variability
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Chores)

(3)
Child LabTotal

0.0406**
(0.0165)
0.0409***
(0.0159)
0.0261**
(0.0117)
0.0246***
(0.00737)
0.0303*
(0.0174)
0.0220
(0.0167)
0.0130
(0.0106)
0.00752
(0.00468)
0.00412
(0.00531)

-0.0291***
(0.0112)
-0.0182*
(0.0107)
-0.0175**
(0.00879)
-0.00686
(0.00549)
-0.0186
(0.0163)
-0.0219***
(0.00746)
-0.0155***
(0.00425)
-0.00851***
(0.00265)
-0.00525**
(0.00227)

0.00814
(0.0105)
0.0132*
(0.00791)
0.00647
(0.00571)
0.00939***
(0.00353)
0.00851
(0.00737)
0.00332
(0.00804)
0.000528
(0.00634)
0.000306
(0.00286)
-0.000165
(0.00183)

Fixed E↵ects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2,924

2,924

2,933

Climate Variability10years
Climate Variability9years
Climate Variability8years
Climate Variability7years
Climate Variability6years
Climate Variability5years
Climate Variability4years
Climate Variability3years
Climate Variability2years

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10
** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap
clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table A6 tests the robustness of our results to controlling for contemporaneous weather shocks. As is clear, the results remain robust. We observe
an increase in child labour on the farm and a reduction in child labour in the
home of similar magnitudes to the main specification.
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Table A6: Number of Hours Worked by Children - Intensive Margin (Contemporaneous Weather Shock)
(1)
Child Labour (Farm)

(2)
Child Labour (Home)

(3)
Child Labour (Total)

Climate Variability

0.0370*
(0.0219)

-0.0261**
(0.0126)

0.00697
(0.0107)

Negative Rainfall Shock

0.0359
(0.139)

0.0108
(0.0823)

0.0359
(0.0710)

Yes

Yes

Yes

3,212
-25,144.587

3,213
-20,180.276

3,222
-21,638.451

Fixed E↵ects
Observations
Log-Likelihood

Notes: Fixed e↵ects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05
*** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at
the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level
in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.
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